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Democracy Promotion versus
Engagement with Iran
SHAHRAM AKBARZADEH
Asia Institute, The University of Melbourne, Victoria, Australia
ABSTRACT US President Barack Obama has tried two very distinct policy options in dealing
with Iran. The engagement policy was designed to make a break with the past experience and
re-start US-Iran relations on a positive footing. This approach was consistent with the advice of-
fered to the new administration by Iran analysts and leaders of non-governmental organisations.
The implication of the engagement policy, however, was sidelining the US commitment to democ-
racy and human rights in Iran. This policy could oﬀer little to the budding reform movement in
2009. The alternative policy of containment was not beneﬁcial to the reform movement either.
The policy shift at the end of 2009 was a response to Iran’s failure to comply with the require-
ments of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The containment policy, manifested in the
fourth round of UN-imposed sanctions on Iran, has led to a further entrenching of the hard-liners
in the regime and intolerance of internal dissent.
KEY WORDS: Obama and Iran, US-Iran relations, democracy, reform, sanctions, Iranian
presidential elections
US President Barack Obama came to oﬃce with a promise of a fresh start. He oﬀered
to talk to the Iranian government and move US-Iran relations away from the brink of
open hostility. This was a very diﬀerent approach to that of his predecessor. Obama
was applauded by advocates of a measured policy towards Iran as breath of fresh air.
His oﬀer to stretch an unclenched hand to Iran was nothing short of revolutionary.
But this willingness to defuse tensions has come at a price for his administration’s
credibility in defending, let alone promoting, the long-standing objective of US
foreign policy objective in the Middle East: democracy. In his eﬀort to re-set relations
with Iran, Obama has managed to blur a signiﬁcant distinction between the interests
of the ruling regime and the ordinary citizens of Iran. This marked a departure from
past US policy, with signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations for democracy promotion in Iran.
Washington had traditionally favoured civil society organisations in unfriendly
states as its natural allies. This strategy resembled the old mantra, the enemy of my
enemy is my friend. During the Cold War era the USA poured signiﬁcant resources
into Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) to reach an audience beyond
the Iron Curtain and circumvent the Soviet grip on the dissemination of information.
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Broadcast in Russian and East European languages, RFE/RL was to give hope and
moral support to dissidents under the Soviet yoke. This programme gained pace as
the Soviet Union started to experiment with glasnost under Mikhail Gorbachev,
freeing up public space for the formation of non-governmental organisations
(NGOs). The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed the USA to make a public
commitment to the promotion of civil society in the post-Soviet space as a ground-up
measure to generate and foster democracy. Over a decade later, this strategy
appeared to be paying oﬀ as civil society groups managed to aﬀect regime change in
Russia’s southern ﬂanks. The so-called colour revolutions of Georgia, Ukraine and
Kyrgyzstan deposed the Moscow-orientated ‘‘old guards’’ and brought to power a
new political elite that was initially more attuned to US interests in the region.
The above experience provided a recipe for change in Iran. In 2006 President
George W. Bush announced increased funding to the Persian language programming
of the Voice of America and the launch of the Iran Democracy Fund. While the
Fund was ostensibly committed to the protection of human rights and basic liberties,
the underlying objective of regime change was unmistakeable. In Tehran, this was
seen as a clear attempt by the ‘‘Great Satan’’ to undermine and ultimately depose the
Islamic regime. One of the early measures adopted by President Obama was to desist
from seeking special funding for democracy promotion in Iran. The US
administration may not have been aware of the gravity with which this policy
reversal would be seen by the ordinary citizens in Iran. After all, some key Iranian
dissidents had already asked the USA to review its ﬁnancial commitment to Iranian
NGOs because it made them vulnerable to state suppression.
During the government crack-down on public rallies in Tehran and other major
Iranian cities, protesting against widespread fraud at the June 2009 election,
President Obama tried to maintain a careful distance. He noted the history of a
diﬃcult relationship between the two countries and stated his desire not be drawn
into Iran’s internal aﬀairs. However, this was an untenable position. After a few
awkward days, President Obama expressed concern at the severity of the Islamic
regime’s treatment of its opponents. But the damage was already done. President
Obama’s vacillation was well intentioned, but it led many protestors in Iran to ask if
the Obama administration was abandoning them in their hour of need.
President Obama’s commitment to exploring alternative ways to engage Iran and
break the self-perpetuating cycle of acrimonious accusations and counter-accusa-
tions appears to have put at risk the standing of the USA as a champion of
democracy. In his eﬀort to ﬁnd a circuit breaker and move outside the parameters set
by his predecessor, President Obama could be turning his back on a budding
democracy movement in Iran. This is, indeed, a very diﬃcult and complex situation.
The present paper is concerned with the recent history of US democracy promotion
in Iran and the range of options open to President Obama in dealing with Iran. This
history has informed Obama’s position and, for that reason, it is important to start
with the Bush policy on Iran.
The Bush Doctrine and Democracy
The Bush Doctrine, which was operationalised in Iraq, was a form of oﬀensive
defence. The logic behind pre-emption was that defence should not be postponed in
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the face of developing threats. The operational word here was ‘‘developing,’’ and the
best way to judge the nature of this developing threat was intelligence. In the case of
Iraq, however, the veracity of the intelligence proved wrong. There is consensus on
that point. But this embarrassment did not lead the Bush administration to re-
examine its policy.
Observers often argue that democratic state building in Iraq was an afterthought
(Fisher, 2003: 389). This was a case of diverting attention from the failure to ﬁnd
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and focusing on the promises of democracy in
the post-Saddam era. Unfortunately for all parties, the democracy project in Iraq has
been critically hampered by sectarian bloodshed and chaos. But this did not dampen
Washington’s enthusiasm for a ‘‘new’’ Middle East, remade in the image of liberal
democracy. The Bush administration continued to present Iraq and Afghanistan as
beacons of hope for democracy in the region.
Promoting democracy and freedom has become a permanent feature of US foreign
policy projection. Drawing on the ingrained belief in the American political culture
about the exceptional qualities of the USA and its mission to lead the world towards
freedom, successive administrations in Washington have placed democracy
promotion at the heart of their foreign policy declarations. Whether it was in the
case of standing up to the ‘‘evil empire’’ of the Soviet Union, or in the case of
defeating terrorism which is purported to pose an existential threat to the American
way of life, democracy is presented as the solution. Francis Fukuyama and Michael
McFaul (2007: 32) have argued that invoking the USA’s supposed unique moral role
in international aﬀairs has practical advantages as it oﬀers an eﬀective framework
for US ambitious. In other words, it is easier to win the approval of the Congress and
the American voters if US policy is formulated in terms of the American values of
freedom and democracy than in terms of geo-strategic objectives. This may be an
accepted way of doing business on Capitol Hill, but it has done extensive damage to
the credibility of the USA in the Middle East.
In line with this tradition, the Bush administration was able to secure
congressional support for a range of initiatives to ‘‘advance democracy and human
rights in Iran’’ (Katzman, 2010: 57). US Congress earmarked US$1.5 million for
educational, humanitarian projects and NGOs in the FY2004 (Table 1). The funds
were managed by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy and Labour and the
National Endowment for Democracy. US commitment to democracy promotion in
Iran was ratiﬁed in the Iran Freedom Support Act which passed the House of
Representatives in April 2006. In that year the Congress approved a further US$66.1
million for democracy promotion in Iran (slightly less than the requested US$75
million). The bulk of the funds were committed to the Persian language programmes
at the Voice of America TV and Radio Farda (Tomorrow). Broadcasting in Persian
to Iran was launched in 1998 under the auspicious of RFE/RL. The Persian
programme evolved into Radio Farda in 2002. It currently provides a 24-hour
service. This is in addition to the Persian programmes at Voice of America TV and
radio with a combined cost of US$10 million per year. Funding democracy-
promotion initiatives continued until the very last days of the Bush administration as
the Congress approved a total US$73.6 million budget for pro-democracy
programmes and the promotion of the rule of law and governance in Iran, as well
as broadcasting Persian language programmes (Katzman, 2007: 37-8).
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The Bush doctrine allowed the pursuit of a double-pronged policy. Democracy
promotion was clearly one policy tool. The other was a series of covert operations to
destabilise the regime and test its ability to respond to internal strife. By its very
nature, the scope of US involvement in covert operations is diﬃcult to research and
document. But the award-winning investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, who
exposed the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, produced an account of US covert
operations in 2008 which seems credible. This account was not repudiated by the
Bush administration. Writing in the respected The New Yorker, Hersh argued that
the US Congress approved a US$400 million request in a Presidential Finding in
2007. He stated: ‘‘The covert activities involve support of the minority Ahwazi Arab
and Baluchi groups and other dissident organizations. They also include gathering
intelligence about Iran’s suspected nuclear-weapons program’’ (Hersh, 2008).
Perhaps the most spectacular operation supported by this scheme was the bombing
of a busload of Revolutionary Guard soldiers in February 2007 near Zahedan,
killing at least 11 Guard members. A local militant group, the Jundallah (Soldiers of
God) claimed responsibility for the bombing. Jundallah is a highly controversial
recipient of US aid because, being active in the poor and remote province of Sistan-
Baluchestan bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is reported to have links with al-
Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2009 Jundallah orchestrated a suicide attack on the
Revolutionary Guards, killing 28 people including the deputy commander of the
Guards and the Chief Commander of the Sistan-Baluchistan province (Tait, 2009).
A Diﬃcult Relationship
There was a window of opportunity for US-Iran rapprochement in 2001 when the
Iranian public exhibited a spontaneous show of solidarity with the victims of the 11
September attacks. This was followed by Tehran’s response to US military action on
Table 1. Iran democracy-promotion funding by the US Congress
FY2004 US$1.5m to advance democracy and human rights in Iran
FY2005 US$3m for democracy promotion, priority areas: political party
development, media, labour rights, civil society and human rights
FY2006 US$11.15m earmarked for democracy promotion in Iran from the regular
FY2006 foreign aid appropriation
FY2006 supp. US$66.1m for democracy promotion earmarked for Voice of America and
Radio Farad broadcasting, cultural exchange and public diplomacy
FY2007 No funds were requested
FY2008 US$60m for democracy promotion, including non-violent eﬀorts to limit
Iran’s inﬂuence in other countries.
US$33.6m for Persian language broadcasting via VOA & Radio Farda
FY2009 No speciﬁc funds for Iran, but US$25m for Near East Regional
Democracy programme
FY2010 No speciﬁc request for democracy promotion in Iran, but the US$40m for
the Near East Regional Democracy programme
FY2011 No speciﬁc request for democracy promotion in Iran, but $40m requested
for the Near East Regional Democracy programme
Source: Extracted from Katzman (2010: 57) and McInerney (2009: 27).
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Iran’s eastern borders. President Mohammad Khatami’s government agreed to work
with the USA to remove the Taliban in Afghanistan and install the government of
Hamid Karzai. These developments seemed unexpected in the context of US-Iran
relations which was characterised by more than two decades of animosity and fear.
The hostage-taking of 1979, when 54 US diplomats and public service workers at the
US embassy in Tehran were held for 444 days by a group of Islamic zealots, sent
relations between the two countries into free fall. The shock of this hostage crisis to
American public opinion and policy making was immense.
The ascent of the reformist cleric Khatami to presidency in 1997 oﬀered an
opportunity to mend fences. Khatami was mindful of the history and the limitations
it placed on him as the president of the proud and revolutionary Iran. He was also
aware of the sense of hurt and fear in the USA that the Iranian revolution and the
hostage-taking had evoked, and the obvious limitations it placed on the US
president. Khatami’s ‘‘dialogue of civilizations’’ initiative was a way to circumvent
the oﬃcial and ideological constraints that prevented direct US-Iran relations. By
emphasising civilizational links, Khatami broadened the scope for inter-state
relations beyond governmental agreements. He hoped to build trust and conﬁdence
in dealing with the international community and, more speciﬁcally, the USA. This
approach also addressed an essential grievance and demand in revolutionary Iran:
parity and equal standing (Lynch, 2000). Khatami founded his argument on the
premise that meaningful dialogue is only possible between two equal partners.
The dialogue of civilizations initiative was greeted with enthusiasm in the
international media. Further, the United Nations adopted 2001 as the year of
dialogue between civilizations. As a public relations strategy, this initiative was a
resounding success. But in terms of oﬀering a way out of the US-Iran impasse, it
proved ineﬀective. The USA maintained that normalisation of relations with Iran
was contingent on Tehran’s cessation of support for international terrorism, by
which it meant Hezbullah and Hamas (Pressman, 2009).
US policy makers should have been aware that this was an unrealistic condition –
not because Iran is an ideologically driven state but in terms of realpolitik. Iran has
few friends in the region. Although neighbouring Arab states wish to avoid direct
confrontation with Iran, they remain suspicious of Tehran’s agenda. Iran’s links with
Shi’a communities in the Persian Gulf is also a source of concern for the Arab
sheikhdoms who view their own Shi’a populations with distrust. This concern with
Iran’s Shi’a network was articulated in 2004 by King Abdullah of Jordan, who saw
the rise of the Shi’a population in the post-Saddam Iraq as contributing to a ‘‘Shi’a
crescent’’ which stretches from Iran to Lebanon. The extent of concern with Iran in
neighbouring Arab capitals was revealed in a WikiLeaks document where the Saudi
king was cited as urging Washington to eliminate Iran’s nuclear programme,
describing it as ‘‘the head of the snake’’ (Reuters, 3 December 2010).
The political landscape of the region places obvious constraints on Iran.
Following the arrival of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the established
presence of the US Navy in the Persian Gulf, the Iranian leadership felt even more
besieged. President George W. Bush’s labelling of Iran as a member of an ‘‘axis of
evil,’’ and the adoption of the so-called Bush Doctrine which entailed the strategy of
‘‘regime change’’ for states that posed risks to US interests, could not but cause
concern in Iran.
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Not surprisingly, Tehran’s response was to circle the wagons and purge what was
perceived to be the weak points in the leadership. The reformist agenda was seen by
powerful and conservative clerics as risky, making Iran vulnerable to external
pressures – a point which will be discussed in relation to NGOs below. The removal
of reformist candidates at the 2004 parliamentary elections by the Guardian Council,
which barred some sitting parliamentarians from running for their seats again,
heralded this retreat from the reform experiment (Akbarzadeh, 2005: 30). The
conservative trajectory of the regime was conﬁrmed by the electoral victory of
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the oﬃce of the presidency in 2005, and his contested re-
election in 2009. The conservative faction has moved to reassert its hold on all
organs of the state and remove all vestiges of reform from public service.
It was not surprising that US relations with Iran became tenser after
Ahmadinejad’s arrival on the scene. The Iranian president’s provocative declarations
on the Holocaust and threats to wipe Israel oﬀ the map, his continued support for
Hezbullah in Lebanon (involved in a bloody war with Israel in 2006) and the alleged
pursuit of nuclear weapons have given cause for serious international concern. Israeli
and US responses to Iranian belligerence fed an already hopeless cycle of
recrimination. President Bush’s repeated insistence that all options are on the table
in relation to the Islamic regime in Iran served to conﬁrm fears in the ranks of the
Iranian leadership that they will be the next target of regime change.
NGOs: A Trojan Horse?
Washington’s declarations in support of civil society and NGOs were interpreted as
a direct challenge to the authority of the Islamic regime in Iran. The experience of
other colour revolutions in Eurasia seemed to substantiate this fear for Tehran. Over
a decade of US investment in support of civil society groups in the former Soviet
space appeared to pay oﬀ in the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia. The government
of President Edward Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Foreign Minister and the last
of the top Soviet oﬃcials to have reincarnated himself as a nationalist leader, was
deposed in a bloodless revolution. The Rose Revolution was led by activists with
strong links to university student associations. Barely a year later, Ukraine
experienced its own Orange Revolution when youth groups mobilised in support
of the opposition presidential candidate. In 2005, the same scenario was being played
out in Kyrgyzstan. The government of President Askar Akaev, who had gained oﬃce
during the Gorbachev era, was removed in the Tulip Revolution. In all the above
civil society-driven revolutions, the push for change was led by liberal-minded
groups, often with strong links to youth organisations that had sprung up in the
post-Soviet era with the assistance of US public and private funds (most notably
George Soros’ Open Society initiative). They also shared another important
characteristic: they were successful, bloodless revolutions because the incumbent
regimes refrained from using the security forces to crush movements of civil
disobedience (Saidazimova, 2005).
This was an obvious lesson for other incumbent regimes. The government of
Uzbekistan kept a watchful eye on the events in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan and was
prepared to act decisively against civil society mobilisation. The Andijan massacre of
some 400 protestors in June 2005 was the Uzbek government’s response to the civil
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society threat. The subsequent closure of foreign NGOs, most notably the Freedom
House and Open Society Institute in Tashkent, left no room for doubt as to whom
President Islam Karimov blamed for the unrest. The US policy of promoting civil
society was increasingly viewed by incumbent regimes in Eurasia as a smokescreen
for a more sinister policy of regime change (Saidazimova, 2005).
The Iranian leadership shares this cynical view and, given the diﬃcult relationship
with the USA, has been very sensitive to US investment in civil society capacity-
building projects. Tehran has systematically targeted academics and activists with
ties to the USA. In 2007, Iranian authorities detained for eight months Haleh
Esfandiari, the programme director of Middle East Studies at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, on suspicion of treason. This was one of the most
high-level cases as Esfandiari, due to her position, was accused of being party to a
clandestine programme to support NGOs. After her release later that year,
Esfandiari published an opinion piece in which she criticised the US democracy-
promotion programme for Iran as misguided and counter-productive. The Bush
administration’s ﬁnancial commitment to an unpublished list of recipients in Iran,
she argued, had made the intellectual and scholarly community in Iran wary of
accepting invitations to conferences in Europe and/or the USA, or accepting
research grants lest they be accused of treason and working for regime change
(Esfandiari and Litwak, 2007). Even before this ﬁnancial commitment, the regime
accused its opponents of receiving bags of money from the USA: ‘‘Now that the U.S.
government is openly talking about providing money to Iranian dissidents and
opposition groups,’’ argued a prominent Iranian journalist,
these oﬃcials can openly and blatantly make accusations against any critical
voice of being supported and ﬁnanced by the US government, thus making it
even easier for the government to suppress them with little resistance or concern
(Memerian, 2006).
Critics of the Bush policy on supporting Iranian civil society argued the policy was
counter-productive and highly detrimental to NGOs. In the words of Abbas Milani
(2005: 42), Director of Iranian Studies at Stanford University, ‘‘patronizing the
democratic movement by throwing money at it will only serve to strengthen the
regime’s claims that democrats in Iran are tools of the United States.’’
Public Opinion and Potential for Change
The closed nature of the oﬃcial political landscape in Iran makes it diﬃcult to
measure public opinion on the sensitive question of US-Iran relations. There are,
however, some indicative factors which may point at the general direction of public
attitude. The very ﬁrst factor is the extent of positive attitudes towards the USA. The
public image of Iran has been one of irrational animosity towards the USA;
however, successive reports suggest that this image is simplistic to the extreme.
Following the establishment of the Islamic regime in 1979, Iran experienced a
population explosion. Iran’s current population is more than 75 million, with about
50% under 26.3 years of age (Central Intelligence Agency, 2010). This large
demographic class has had no ﬁrsthand experience of the Pahlavi regime or the
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revolution that deposed it. The anti-American sentiments that were prevalent during
the revolution do not resonate with the post-revolution generation.
At the same time, the economy is a primary concern for the population. Iran is
suﬀering from runaway inﬂation and high unemployment rates. Oﬃcial records in
Iran put the annual inﬂation rate for 2007 at 17%. Unemployment rates are
estimated to be between 11% and 14%, while the head of Iran’s Statistics Centre
admits the unemployment rate among those between 15 and 24 years of age stands at
25.6% (Al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 May 2008).
The high cost of living has made life especially diﬃcult for those wanting to start
their own family. Unable to aﬀord a family home, young Iranian couples either settle
in with the groom’s family, exerting ﬁnancial and social pressure on the expanding
family unit, or opt to postpone their wedding, putting strain on the relationship and
leaving themselves vulnerable to accusations of adultery by the religious police. Life
under the Islamic regime is not easy and the post-revolutionary generation in Iran ﬁnds
it hard to understand why. Large sections of the population, galvanised under the
green banner of the reform movement, are disillusioned with the political and econo-
mic trajectory of the country and the regime’s standing hostility towards the USA.
This presents a serious challenge to the Islamic regime, especially under the
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It might be suggested that a sizeable share of
the population would not automatically view normal relations with the USA as
problematic. This goes to the core of the regime. Anti-Americanism was a legacy of
the 1979 revolution – quietly sidelined under Khatami but revived under
Ahmadinejad. A public opinion survey by Terror Free Tomorrow (2007) among
1000 people across Iran found that 68% of the respondents favoured normal
relations between the USA and Iran, as well as recognising Israel along with a
Palestinian state. This is a remarkable proportion for a telephone survey where the
respondents are unaware of the identity of the pollsters and ever-concerned about
government eavesdropping on private conversations. This survey conﬁrmed the
ﬁndings of an earlier poll in 2002 which challenged the popularity of the regime’s
anti-US rhetoric. A poll commissioned by the Iranian parliament’s national security
committee found ‘‘that 74% of Iranians over the age of ﬁfteen favoured the
resumption of relations with the United States while 46% felt that US policies on
Iran were ‘to some extent correct’’’ (Ashouri, 2003: 3).
These ﬁndings reveal attitudes that have the potential to shake the foundations of
the Islamic regime. Foreign visitors and Western journalists to Iran are often amazed
at the welcome reception they receive. It is clear to visitors that regime anti-
American hysteria is not a national trait. Some observers have tried to quantify the
level of popular support for the regime’s hard-line policies. Karim Sadjadpour (2006-
07: 160), an analyst with the International Crisis Group, estimates the regime’s
support-base to be around 20%.
Perhaps it was the realisation of this popular sentiment that prompted the head of
the Iranian delegation in talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Ali Larijani, now the speaker of the parliament, to express a readiness for direct talks
with the USA. He said: ‘‘We may be sure that the Americans are our enemies [but]
working with the enemy is part of the work of politics’’ (cited in Takeyh, 2007: 26).
The positive attitude towards the USA is a potential asset in any US push for
democracy in Iran. But selling the idea of democracy to Iranians is a complex matter.
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On the one hand, Iranians have been deprived of a representative government and
are thirsty for accountability over the institutions of the state. The governing
philosophy of Velayat Faqih, or the political supremacy of the most-learned Shi’a
cleric, is an anathema to popular will and public accountability. In this philosophy,
governance is reserved for God as the ultimate law maker, and for the faqih (Islamic
jurisprudent) who can act as the agent of Divine Law. In other words, the political
leadership is accountable to God and the Supreme Leader, not to the public. This
puts the lie to various elected bodies, most notably the national parliament. The
failure of the reformist-minded parliament during Khatami’s presidency to aﬀect any
meaningful change, always vetoed by the appointed cohort of conservatives in the
Guardian Council, brought to the fore the truly undemocratic nature of the regime.
This experience was an eye opener for many in the reform camp who had hoped to
transform the regime from within.
On the other hand, however, the record of US democracy promotion in Iran’s
neighbourhood has been highly questionable. Despite early optimism among some
Iranians regarding the US involvement in Iraq and the possible ﬂow-on beneﬁts for
democracy in Iran, the ongoing bloodshed dashed hopes and led to disillusionment.
The problem for the US administration is that its version of democracy in Iraq is
indistinguishable from civil war and chaos. The Islamic regime may not be popular
in Iran, but nobody wants chaos to replace it.
The idea of regime change was received initially with some excitement in some
circles in Iran. The ousting of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein within two years
elicited both elation and trepidation. Popular jokes started to emerge regarding a
US-initiated regime change in Iran. In 2003 this seemed like a real possibility. But
such hopes faded as Iraq under US occupation descended into bloodshed.
There is an underlying aversion to violence among the Iranian critics of the
regime, which explains why the idea of a US-induced regime change lost its appeal so
quickly. This aversion has its roots in the experience of the 1979 revolution. Then the
popular movement viewed the loss of life as the price that needed to be paid for
deposing monarchy. Millions of people rallying in capital cities around the country
were united in the conviction that the Pahlavi Dynasty was corrupt and had betrayed
Iran’s national interests by giving the USA unfettered access to Iran’s natural
resources. There was a sense of urgency, fanned by Ayatollah Khomeini who
adroitly rode the tide of popular resentment against the Shah. The movement was
united in the belief that nothing could be as bad as the Shah’s regime and the Pahlavi
Dynasty. And the loss of life during the revolution was seen as simply part of the
process of deposing monarchy and heralding a republic. The revolutionary days of
1978-79 gave rise to unbridled optimism and great expectations about the post-
Pahlavi era.
The situation in Iran now is nothing like the revolutionary period of 1978-79.
There is no shared certainty about the post-Islamic regime. Critics of the regime still
remember their naı¨ve optimism of three decades ago and are not prepared to make
the same mistake. Contributing to this scepticism about the beneﬁts of regime
change is the absence of a coherent opposition platform to inspire and mobilise a
popular movement. The reformist wing of the regime, those aﬃliated with former
President Khatami and the defeated presidential candidates Moussavi and Karroubi,
have lost signiﬁcant appeal as a result of their reluctance to confront conservative
478 S. Akbarzadeh
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 1
8:5
1 0
8 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
 
bullies in the Guardian Council. This has left the opposition movement without
vision and leadership. Although the spontaneous energy of Iranian youth has
managed to keep the pressure on the regime at enormous costs, prospects of change
remain dim.
Obama’s Options
President Obama inherited a diﬃcult challenge in Iran from his predecessor. Two
key issues needed urgent attention: Iran’s nuclear ambitions and popular aspirations
for democracy. Finding the appropriate mix of policies to address both eﬀectively
has so far eluded the US administration. On the one hand, the Obama
administration launched its diplomatic overtures towards Iran on the basis that
bringing Iran to the negotiating table without any preconditions oﬀered the best
chance of mitigating the risk of nuclear proliferation in Iran and the region. In an
obvious attempt to shift away from the Bush mantra of ‘‘regime change’’ and the
threat of military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, the Obama administration
insisted that it sought to resolve the dispute through diplomacy. However, on the
other hand, by such engagement initiatives the Obama administration appeared to
be sanctioning the incumbent regime in Iran and turning its back on the democratic
aspirations of the Iranian reformers and demonstrators.
Engaging Iran was seen by many as a betrayal of the US commitment to
democracy. Diﬀerent permutations of this view were expressed by observers from the
far-right to centre-left. Writing shortly after Obama took oﬃce, Thomas Carothers,
the Vice President of Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
argued that the Obama administration should resist the urge to ‘‘stay clear of any
eﬀort to support democratic change in the Middle East,’’ or what he termed a
‘‘realist corrective’’ (Carothers, 2009: 2). Carothers argued that the excesses of the
Bush era, which badly tarnished the US image in the Middle East, should not lead
Obama to step away from a commitment to democracy in the region. Instead, that
commitment needs to be pursued in tandem with other policy objectives within a co-
operative framework to include US allies.
But in the ﬁrst months of his presidency, the urge to move away from policies
associated with the Bush administration appeared to have been compelling. This was
evident in a number of measures related to Iran. Fully aware that congressional
funding for democracy promotion was seen in Tehran as an attempt at regime
change, Obama did not request any funds in relation to Iran (Table 1). Instead, all
civil society and democracy-orientated initiatives for Iran were absorbed in the new
Near East Regional Democracy (NERD) programme. This made such programmes
less salient and threatening to the regime. President Obama’s Iran policy was also
inﬂuenced by voices for moderation on US-Iran relations. In 2006, Akbar Ganji, a
long-standing dissident who spent six years in jail and published a biting critique of
the regime, pleaded with the USA to refrain from secret deals with Iran. He urged
instead for transparency and direct talks with Iran, arguing that encouraging
democratisation in Iran is best achieved through open dialogue. This message
became the core point of contention in the academic literature on Iran as US-based
scholars, such as Ray Takeyh (2007) and Abbas Milani (2005), warned of the
dangers entailed in pursing regime change. Attempts at regime change by force or by
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stealth through civil society promotion, they argued, were likely to be counter-
productive with serious regional repercussions. Making direct overtures to Iran and
keeping the regime engaged with the international community, the argument went,
was the best way to aﬀect its behaviour. Indeed, the emphasis should be on
behaviour change, not regime change (Maloney, 2008: 25).
This line of argument has contended that Iran has legitimate interests in the region
and could indeed play a positive role in bringing stability to Iraq and Afghanistan.
The challenge for the USA is to ﬁrst acknowledge these interests and second
encourage Iran to act in accordance with them. Mir H. Sadat and James P. Hughes
(2010: 46), for example, have argued that
U.S. cooperation with Iran in Afghanistan is necessary and achievable. As part
of a comprehensive policy toward the region, the United States should consider
a strategy of diplomatic engagement with Iran aimed at achieving cooperation
on shared security and stability interests in Afghanistan.
President Obama’s Iran policy in early 2009 followed this logic closely, assuming
that an engaged Islamic republic would be more attuned to international pressure
than an ostracised one. President Obama’s message to the people of Iran on
YouTube on the occasion of the Iranian New Year, his oﬀer of direct talks without
pre-conditions and his cautious response to widespread fraud at the June 2009
presidential election were designed to achieve an elusive breakthrough. Unfortu-
nately for Obama’s administration and those espousing a policy shift on Iran,
President Ahmadinejad failed to reciprocate goodwill gestures. This put serious
strains on Obama’s engagement policy. Revelations about a clandestine nuclear
facility near Qom, while Iran refused to subject its nuclear programme to the full
inspection regime of the IAEA and the subsequent missile tests (capable of reaching
Israel and US interests in the region) delivered a further blow to the engagement
policy (Cowell and Fathi, 2009; Sanger and Broad, 2010).
The failure of this strategy of engagement has proved to be costly in two distinct
ways. First is the obvious failure to modify the behaviour of the Islamic regime. This
approach had been dismissed by neo-conservatives as Utopian and misguided from
day one. John Bolton (2009), former US Ambassador to the United Nations, and
Dick Cheney (2009), the former Vice President, were very vocal in their criticism of
Obama’s Iran policy. They claimed it only allowed the Islamic regime to advance its
nuclear weapon’s programme beyond the point of no-return and consolidate its hold
on power. Tehran’s failure to respond to Obama’s engagement policy is likely to
bolster such criticism and lead to a serious rethinking of the Iran policy in the
Obama administration. Second, this policy appears to have come at the expense of
Iranian civil society. Obama’s overtures to the regime and his eﬀort to correct a
misguided Bush legacy by scaling-down the Iran Democracy Fund has left the
impression that the USA is turning its back on street protestors and dissidents in
Iran. The impression that the USA is betraying ‘‘forces of democracy’’ could be
costly. As Milani warned in 2005, Iranian dissidents fear they may be used as a
bargaining chip in a game of realpolitik between Tehran and Washington. This fear
seemed very real in June 2009 as those aﬃliated with the Green movement chanted:
‘‘Obama, are you with us or with the regime?’’ (Worth, 2009).
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The failure of the engagement initiative and Iran’s continued pursuit of nuclear
technology outside of the inspection regime imposed by the IAEA led to UN
Security Council resolution 1929 on 9 June 2010. This resolution imposed stringent
and wide-ranging restrictions on Iran to force its compliance. The extent to which
sanctions can aﬀect policy, however, is highly questionable (Maloney, 2010). In the
past, the Iranian regime has managed to thwart the impact of sanctions by ﬁnding
alternative supply sources for its technology needs, most notably North Korea, while
pointing to international sanctions for anti-Western propaganda in its domestic
politics. There is little evidence to suggest that the new round of sanctions will
achieve a policy reversal in Tehran.
Conclusion
In 2009 the US State Department refused to renew its contract with the Iran Human
Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) at Yale University (Feith and Weiss, 2009).
The IHRDC was established in 2004 to catalogue human rights abuses in Iran. The
State Department’s decision, shortly after the crack-down against the Green move-
ment protesting election results, was an indication of a clear policy shift towards Iran.
True to his declared commitment to open channels of communication with Iran and
not interfere in the domestic aﬀairs of the Islamic republic, Obama followed a logical
path to facilitate engagement. The fact that his eﬀorts at engagement failed to impress
the Iranian authorities was less due to his eﬀorts and more to the domestic political
limitations in Iran. The consequent shift towards sanctions to force compliance with
the IAEA regime is unlikely to produce better results. The Obama administration
may see sanctions as the last resort to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions, short of going
to war. But Iran’s performance under years of sanctions suggests that such measures
have little chance of changing policy in Tehran.
The consequences of Obama’s policies are not beneﬁcial to civil society and
democracy in Iran. Democracy activists in Iran seem to get a rough deal either way. The
initial engagement policy came at their expense as the Obama administration
downgraded its support for Iranian dissidents. Furthermore, the shift to containment
did nothing to help civil society activists. The containment policy continues to maintain
the mantra of non-interference in Iran’s domestic aﬀairs while making the regime
extremely anxious about its survival, resulting in greater suppression of dissent. Iranian
civil society and the general population are the biggest losers in the US-Iran gridlock.
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